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the open transaction doctrine, the cash or
distributable share of accrued income and gain
ultimately achieved by the service partner
remains compensation.
The issue is at least symbolic of something
deeply rotten about the tax base and tax equity.
The top 25 hedge fund managers had aggregate
compensation of 11 billion last year, a year in
which the funds significantly underperformed
the stock market as a whole.3 The monkeys
picking stocks at random did better last year than
the hedge funds. Managers are paid 2 percent of
assets per year under industry standard practice,
even when the monkeys do better. They get 20
percent of profit, even if profit is under par. One
should also never assume that this treatment is
wise social engineering by Congress, exactly
calibrating the cost of tax lost to purchase of what
needs to be accomplished. The loophole is
available for subpar performance.
4
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Bill of 2017 addresses
carried interests with ambiguous language,
which leaves current law largely intact however
the ambiguity is resolved. The bill would adopt a
new section 1061 of the code which says that the
taxpayer’s net long-term capital gain with respect
to a partnership interests received for services
shall be computed using a three-year holding
period, instead of the current-law, one-year
holding period. There are at least two
interpretations of that language. The narrowest is
that section 1061 does not affect passed-through
capital gain. Under current law, holding period
for portfolio stock the funds sell is determined at
5
the partnership level and the partner’s holding
period for the partnership interest has no impact
on whether gain passed through from the
partnership is long term or short term. A partner
can get long-term gain immediately if the
partnership has held the sold asset for the
requisite holding period. Because section 1061
says nothing about the partnership’s calculation
of holding period, the service partner might get

3

Kathryn Dill, “Top-Earning Hedge-Fund Managers Raked in $11
Billion Last Year, Despite Disappointing Returns,” CNBC (May 17, 2017).
The two highest-earning hedge fund managers were paid a total of $4
billion. Id.
4
5

long-term capital gain passed through under the
old one-year holding period. Under that
interpretation section 1061 would have an
impact when the taxpayer, that is, the partner, has
gain with respect to the partnership interest either
by a sale of it or by a distribution with respect to
the interest that is in excess of the partner’s basis.
Partners in the funds do occasionally sell their
partnership interests or get distributions in excess
of basis, but the in usual course, the sale or
exchange of the partnership interest in a fund
occurs only in liquidation. By that time, all of
the gain from the fund has been recognized by
pass through on sale of portfolio assets and there
is no further gain. The interpretation that section
1061 does not affect passed-through gain makes
section 1061 almost an empty gesture. It will
come up some, but not often.
Section 1061 might also mean the service
partner can get a pass through of long-term
capital gain, to which the lower rate applies, only
if the partnership has held its portfolio stock asset
for more than three years. Section 1061 does not
explicitly say anything about partnership
calculations of short- or long-term status under
section 701(a)(2), but it might be implied, so as to
prevent long-term status for stock assets held for
under three years. That is a more restrictive
interpretation of section 1061, but not world
changing. Many of the funds either can and do
hold their portfolio stocks for three years, or turn
over assets so quickly they do not even try to
qualify for even the current one-year holding
period. Under either interpretation of section
1061, this debate about the propriety of current
law’s treatment of carried interests remains an
important issue, beyond the modest reach of new
section 1061, however modest that reach is.
I. The Defining Heritage
Under the defining heritage responsible for
capital gain treatment, compensation is not
supposed to be capital gain, regardless of the form
by which it is achieved. Capital gain arises from
British conceptions of capital under which the
castle and manor (that is, capital) belonged to the
next male heir, even if the capital had appreciated

H.R. 1, 115th Cong , 1st Sess. section 3314, enacting IRC section 1061.
See section 702(a)(2).
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in value. Income arose as the interest accessible to
living persons, encompassing “the annual
produce, the grass, the apples and things of that
6
sort.” The term “property” in section 1221,
defining capital asset, comes directly from the
British concept of capital. Property for capital gain
means capital under the tradition. If something is
income, it belongs by right to the income interest
under the tradition and income tax gets a share of
it at ordinary tax rates. Thus, the courts
appropriately have held that income items
including rent, royalties, interest, ordinary
business income, and compensation are not
capital gain under the traditional meaning even
when they arise from the sale of something that in
other contexts might reasonably be called
property.7 Not all property, as the term might be
understood in other contexts, qualifies as capital
8
and thus does not qualify as capital gain.
Compensation under the tradition is the earner’s
own money, and it did not have to be preserved as
capital exclusively for the yet-unknown male heir.
Those who earn the compensation may use it.
Capital gain is also the gain from the
appreciation of capital. For compensation there is
no capital that explains the gain. The traditional
term, “capital,” has evolved into the tax term
“basis.” Under current law, without basis, the
gain from compensation is not the appreciation of
9
capital, and is not capital gain. Compensation
requires the investment of hard work, but work
does not create basis; if it did, no wages could ever
be taxed. Compensation is the product of work,
not basis, and thus is never appropriately
considered to be capital gain produced by capital.
Consistently, capital gain is also a relief from
double taxation or double distortion under which

both the investment in capital and the yield from
capital are subjected to tax.10 The relief is partial:
Much of the yield from capital, including rents,
royalties, and interest, are ordinary income.
Capital gain yields a reduction of tax not an
exemption from double tax. Still, without an
investment of capital, there is no yield from
capital, no double distortion, and no capital gain.
Compensation is not attributable to the
investment of capital and so never qualifies as
capital gain, once one understands the tradition
and the meaning of the term.
Capital gain for compensation is always a
loophole. Ordinary income, the Supreme Court
has said, “is broad enough to include in taxable
income any economic or financial benefit
conferred . . . as compensation, whatever the form
11
or mode by which it is effected.” Section
1221(a)(3) now provides that artistic or literary
property is an ordinary asset in the hands of the
creator. Under prior law, when General Dwight D.
Eisenhower sold the rights to his book, Crusade in
Europe, for instance, he reported capital gain from
12
his efforts. The subsection was adopted
specifically to close what the committee report
called a “loophole.”13 Section 83 was enacted first
against a loophole under which restricted stock
given as compensation was taxed as
compensation neither when the stock was
transferred to the executive nor when the
14
restriction lapsed. We may appropriately call
capital gain for compensation a loophole, under
ordinary English usage.
Capital gain has been allowed to expand
beyond its tradition. It originally applied only to
interests that were preserved for the yet-unknown
male heir, that no living person had access to, and
that no living person could consume. Congress

6

Walter Strachan, A Digest of the Law of Trust Accounts, Chiefly in
Relation to Lifeowner and Remainderman 25 (1911) (footnote and citations
omitted).
7

See, e.g., United States v. Midland-Ross Corp., 381 U.S. 54 (1965) (gain
from sale of bond was interest); Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transport,
364 U.S. 130 (1960) (proceeds from sale of carveout was rent); Burnet v.
Harmel, 287 U S. 103 (1932) (periodic royalties on oil and gas lease were
like business-operating income although considered a sale of property
under state law), superseded by statute, section 613A.
8

Gillette Motor Transport, 364 U.S. at 134.

9

Vestal v. United States, 498 F.2d 487, 494 (8th Cir. 1974) (sale of
partnership interest with zero basis was compensation not capital gain);
Bryan v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 972, 981 (1961) (sale was compensation not
capital gain). Cf. reg. section 1.83-3(a)(6) (indication that no transfer has
occurred is that employee does not bear risk of loss).

10

Joseph Bankman and David A. Weisbach, “The Superiority of an
Ideal Consumption Tax Over an Ideal Income Tax,” 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1413,
1418 (2006).
11

Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177, 181 (1945) (options were
compensation even if intended to give employee an ownership interest
in the employer corporation).
12

Associated Press, “Eisenhower to Pay Tax as an ‘Amateur’ Writer,”
The New York Times, June 2, 1948, at 31 (reporting that the IRS ruled that
Eisenhower had capital gain from sale of Crusade in Europe because he
was an amateur).
13

S. Rep. No. 2375, at 43-44 (1950).

14

See Walter J. Blum, “Restricted Stock Arrangements Reconsidered,”
46 Taxes 598, 604-605 (1968).
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has also used the lower capital gains rates as a
honey pot for specially connected people. Still,
capital gain is not an always-open-season free
range without rules. As long as most people pay
ordinary income tax on their compensation, that
establishes the tax principle that everyone should.
II. Step by Step to Error
The Kahns explain how capital gain for
compensation of the manager of a fund arises
under the logic of current law, step by step. Still,
while their explanation fits current positive law,
their explanation does not justify the capital gain
normatively at the end of the steps. Each step,
moreover, could and should have been contested
and come out the other way, at least once you see
the bad result. A bad step under current law is a
self-inflicted wound by Treasury, prematurely
closing off measurement of compensation under
the open transaction doctrine. But more generally,
compensation to a service provider remains
compensation, even if the fund manager is made
a partner in a partnership with tax-preferenced
income.
The Kahns start by assuming that self-created
property appropriately generates capital gain.
They then argue that joint efforts at creating
property also justify capital gain. They then leap
to say that capital gain is fine for services
performed for others. Or at least if that is not true
generally, subchapter K makes it true. The Kahns
say compensation must be measured when the
manager gets an income interest in the
partnership, and because the value of the interest
then cannot reasonably be ascertained, it is
deemed to be zero. The artificially deemed zerovalue compensation is then the end of any
compensation, and we switch over in full to
partnership mode, rather than compensation
mode of taxation. Because the profits from a
hedge, venture capital, or equity fund are capital
gain at the partnership level, the fund manager,
post-compensation measurement, gets to treat the
gain as capital gain with the character passed
through from the partnership. Each of the steps is
both the result reached by current law, and
without normative value. Bad results do not have
a normative penumbra — any more than say a
boil generalizes to describe the beauty of the
human body.

A. Self-Created Property
The Kahns argue, first, that property created
by labor — by sweat equity — is a capital asset.
Courts have indeed held that the gain from
building a house or a ship for a sale to a single
customer will qualify as capital gain, as long as
one is not also a distributor selling to customers
(plural).15 Still, the results are not as clean or as
good as the Kahns describe. The courts say that a
major factor in determining whether real estate
falls within the section 1221(a)(1) ordinaryincome exception from capital gain for holding
for sale to customers is whether the seller has
improved the property.16 When Congress
recharacterized artistic and literary property as an
ordinary asset to the creator, it appropriately
called the prior law — capital gain for books and
art — a loophole. Compensation is income and
does not need to be preserved for the male heir,
even if compensation is achieved by making
things. A taxpayer who makes and sells
something is making compensation, not different
in substance from ordinary wages.
Capital gain on self-created assets is a
violation of tax principle, but self-created assets
have secondary importance in a complex
economy. In a complex economy, taxpayers are
not typically self-employed, if artists and writers
are disregarded. The rule also does not allow sales
of the product to customers. Even if available and
tolerable in an unimportant sector, sweat equity
should not generalize beyond its strict borders.
Bad rules have no penumbra.
B. Services for Others
The fund managers are not building for
themselves, however, but for others. The Kahns
say that a group or joint creation of property

15

Commissioner v. Williams, 256 F.2d 152, 155 (5th Cir. 1958) (allowing
capital gain ship for one buyer); Gangi v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987561 (allowing capital gain on sale of condos that taxpayer built).
16

See, e.g., Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United States, 526 F.2d 409, 422-423
(5th Cir. 1976) (listing factors yielding capital gain, including
improvements); Long v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-233 (developer
hiring architect, applying for zoning relief, printing brochures, and
taking deposits on 20 percent of units was enough development to make
land an ordinary asset), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, per curiam, 772 F.3d 670
(11th Cir. 2014) (ostensibly reversing Tax Court on another issue, which
was that taxpayer sold a judgment rather than the not-yet-purchased
land); Adam v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 996, 1003-1004 (1973) (holding that
taxpayer was a passive investor, not improver).
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should also get capital gain once it is assumed a
single builder gets capital gain. That is a dicier
conclusion. Long-standing and unbeatable
regulations provide that when a taxpayer receives
services in exchange for their services, the fair
market value of the services received is gross
17
income. Thus, for example, if a tour guide
organizes a trip to Europe and gets a free trip as a
reward for the services, the value of the trip is
18
income. If a carpenter and plumber exchange
services in building the house, both sides have
ordinary income, and there is an added basis in
the house for the amount included in income.
Indeed, even if they are both carpenters, there is
no tax exemption for like-kind exchanges of
services.
Exchanges of services within a family are best
understood as tax-exempt support. In a profound
sense, our income tax is based on households and
transfers within the household, whether or not in
exchange for services, are properly ignored.
Informal exchanges of services among friends and
neighbors are — and reasonably should be —
tolerated as outside the tax system, even though
rewards for services are taxable in theory.
When informal exchanges of services get too
formal, however, for instance in a barter club, the
IRS can and will collect tax on both parties to the
exchange, including with information returns and
19
backup withholding of tax. Billion-dollar hedge
fund compensation is on the taxable side, neither
informal nor small enough to be ignored as not
worth the effort of enforcement.
Capital gain for self-service is sometimes an
acceptable result, whereas capital gain for service
to others is not. If, for instance, I spend 60 hours a
week working on my investment portfolio, the
value added by my services (if any) is not
ordinary income under current law. The stock is
the same and has not been created or improved. I
have not built anything. I am buying and selling
on the same market, so I am not performing a
service of distributing the stock. The smart market
17

Reg. section 1.61-2(d)(1) (1960).

18

says that the price on a broad market already
reflects all public information on value, which
implies that gains I get above what a welldiversified portfolio would give is attributable to
taking on too much risk or to sheer luck. There is
well-based skepticism that I received
compensation or built anything with my services.
It does not follow that financial advisers can
get capital gain on compensation they earn by
managing or advising others on what to invest in,
even if the investment advice I give myself is
treated as consistent with capital gain. Working
for others as a financial adviser yields ordinary
income both in theory and in practice. People
providing financial services get no help from the
rule that self-help does not turn capital gain into
compensation.
The distinction between self-created property
and working for others is unbridgeable. One
indeed wonders why self-created property ever
comes up in these discussions. Is the argument
that because some compensation avoids ordinary
tax, it all must?
C. Partnerships
Under current law, a partnership with a taxfavored source of income may pay a partner who
provides services by giving the service provider a
share of the tax-favored income the partnership
has achieved. Under subchapter K, governing
taxation of partnerships, the character of an item
as capital gain or ordinary income is determined
exclusively at the partnership level.20 If the item is
long-term capital gain or tax-exempt income to
the partnership, it is also capital gain or taxexempt income to the partner. That the share is
given to the service-provider partner only as a
quid pro quo for the services provided does not
matter as long as the services were performed in
their “capacity as a partner.” The serviceproviding partner has ordinary income from the
compensation for services only as if the services
21
are performed, not in their capacity as a partner
— whatever that means. Subchapter K thus
allows an alchemy turning lead into gold, that is,
compensation for work done becomes not

Rev. Rul. 64-154, 1964-1 C.B. 72.

19

See, e.g., IRS Publication 525, “Bartering,” Example 3 (member of
barter club has ordinary income from claim on arising from services);
Form 1099-B, “Reporting Income from Barter Exchange”; reg. section
31 3406(b)(3)-2 (providing for reporting of income and backup
withholding by barter exchanges).

20
21

Section 702(b) by reference to section 702(a)(2).
Section 707.
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ordinary income but tax-favored income if the
partnership has a source of tax-favored income to
share with the partner.
The alchemy of ordinary lead into capital gain
gold or better is limited by tax-minimization tax
planning, which is supposed to look at both
parties to a transaction. A distributive share given
to the service provider means the tax-favored
item is diverted from other partners, so the
alchemy is useful only if the other partners cannot
use the tax favor as well as the service partner can.
Corporate partners, for instance, pay the same tax
on capital gain as on ordinary income so they do
not usually mind diverting capital gain to a
service-providing partner who will get a lower tax
rate on capital gain instead of paying with taxdeductible cash. Tax-exempt investors also can
give up capital gains character to service partners.
If the services are capital expenditures, the
compensation would be basis, not an immediate
deduction, which limits the value of
“compensation” characterization to the paying
partners. Compensation can also be written up as
for services “not in capacity as a partner,” or a
guaranteed payment which would give the
partnership a compensation deduction in
computing its taxable income. The alchemy of
converting compensation into capital gain is thus
useful only because the other partners have
limited use for a compensation deduction. Still,
when giving tax-favored items to high-bracket
service providers minimizes tax, the partnership
can be used, like alchemy, to transform
compensation from ordinary income (lead) into
something better.
The ability of a partnership to turn ordinary
compensation into capital gain or better is silly, or
to use a technical term — mashugana. Subchapter
K, governing partnerships, should never be able
to put a blanket over compensation and hide it.
Subchapter K is supposed to be the servant of
substantive tax law. Except for minor
administrative or procedural issues, where
convenience is worth a (slightly) different result,
if subchapter K and substantive law outside of
subchapter K diverge, it is subchapter K that is in
error.
There is nothing in the partnership relations
that justifies a distinction from any other service
provider. A partner performing services is an

22

agent of the partnership, just as an employee,
officer, or independent contractor is an agent of
the business for whom the services are provided.
We can create a spectrum of service providers:
Some service providers are paid straight salary;
some employees are offered a profit-sharing plan
as a fringe benefit; some agents get substantial
bonuses measured by performance; some get a
trivial guaranteed salary and get almost all their
pay according to outcome; and some service
providers get paid only on commission or by a
share in the output. Some service providers work
under close supervision; some are independent;
and some give orders to others. All have ordinary
income for their compensation. At no place along
the spectrum should it matter that the principal
and agent cross off the “employee” label or
“independent contractor” on their contractual
papers and substitute “partner.” There is no
substantive cutoff along the spectrum. Service
partners are still service providers, with a profitsharing plan, entitled to no special deal.
The right rule, in lieu of section 702, is that
compensation is ordinary income as received if it
is compensation at either the partnership or the
partner level. Some partnerships, in law,
accounting, architecture, or other services, make
only compensation be judged either at partner or
at partnership level. But the managers of venture
capital funds, equity funds, or hedge funds work
for funds that make capital gain from
appreciation of stock purchased by the fund. The
work they perform for the fund is rewarded by
compensation even when the fund has only
capital gain.23
It is not hard to identify compensation. The
Kahns use examples of managers of funds who

22

See, e.g., Uniform Partnership Act, section 301 (1997) (partner is
agent of the partnership).
23

If the partner has compensation income, the partnership should
probably be treated as having a compensation expense at the same time
and amount. See section 83(h). If the law did not give the partnership a
deduction, the parties should ordinarily structure the payment as
compensation for services not in capacity as a partner, deductible by the
payer. Still, an alternative, asymmetrical treatment in which the service
provider has ordinary income and the partnership has given up a share
of capital gain should not be beyond the pale. The asymmetry would
resemble other examples. Architect fees, for example, are capital
expenditures, ordinary income to the recipient, but only basis to the
payer. Section 264(a)(1) makes expenses otherwise deductible as
business or production of income expenses into nondeductible expenses
when the expenses are costs of tax-exempt interest, even when the
expenses are ordinary income to the recipient.
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contribute no capital. The managers in the
examples have zero basis and zero capital for their
share. All their return is explained by their
services. In other examples, however, service
managers might also contribute capital, as have
prior earnings left in the partnership. Partnership
shares having basis are different shares from
compensation shares, and those shares should be
able to participate in capital gain or other taxfavored income of the partnership just as other
capital partners do. But partnership shares, like
corporate stock, are divisible.
When the service partner has some capital
shares with basis, there is danger of allocation to
the service partner that is in fact compensation
but falsely characterized as if it were a return of
tax-advantaged income on the capital shares. It is
not a difficult nor unusual enforcement problem.
A service partner who is getting a larger share of
tax-advantaged income of the partner,
disproportionate to capital contributed or
earnings left undistributed, and larger than what
the partnership as a whole gets for the year as a
percentage of capital is getting compensation and
not a return on capital. These cases can be rooted
out by the strong arm of the law.
There is also danger of an insider service
partner claiming basis (that is, capital) for confetti
debt used to acquire a capital share in the
partnership. Debt is respected in the tax law only
because payment of the debt has a discounted
expected present value equal to the face amount
of the debt; service-partner debt needs to be a cash
equivalent. Service-partner debt for purchase of a
partnership share might trigger an alert for
special attention, because the debt does not have a
value equal to the face amount paid, but it is not
an insurmountable problem for ordinary
enforcement of the law. Many transactions
respected among arm’s-length parties are recast
when employer and service provider are
involved. A bargain purchase between strangers
is not a realization event, for example, but an
employee has immediate income from a bargain
24
purchase from his employer.

D. Open Transition
A fund manager who receives an income
interest in the fund has nothing upon which to be
taxed. Nothing has been earned yet, and nothing
has accrued. Receipt of the interest is an open
transaction that avoids tax because value is not
ascertainable. If the interest is traded on an
established market, is sold soon enough for the
sale to establish value, or consists of known future
cash flows with a calculable net present value,
then the compensation transaction is closed based
on known value. Absent that, compensation is
measured when the service provider achieves a
distribution or at least a distributable share of
partnership income. An open transaction has two
sides: deferral, because taxing early does not work
right, and ordinary taxation latter when the
results can be fairly measured. The general open
transaction of current law was ruptured, however,
because Treasury and the IRS stopped the second
step.
Carried interests became a serious problem
because the IRS ruled that the fund manager
could get their interest in the partnership, taxing
the interest as if it were worthless, and that that
transfer of the deemed-worthless interest ended
all future possibility of measuring compensation.
The service partner thereafter got access to the
mashugana section 702 rule that the compensation
element is ignored if the partnership level has
capital gain. A partnership profits interest is an
interest that would give the partner no
distribution if the partnership were liquidated
25
immediately. In Rev. Proc. 93-27 the IRS held that
it would not tax profits interests when issued, and
would instead wait until partnership income (or
capital gain) was passed through to the partner,
conceding years of litigation in which the IRS had
experienced mixed results. In 2005 the IRS also
announced its intent to tax capital interests only
as measured by the amount that would be paid to
the partner on an immediate liquidation, at the
time of issuance, even when a substantial risk of
forfeiture of the interest lapses at a later date.26 The
fund managers under the industry standard

25

Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-1 C.B. 343.

26

24

Section 83(a)(1) and (2).

Notice 2005-43, 2005-1 C.B. 1221, announcing proposed section 4.03
to Rev. Proc. 93-27.
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practice get their interests in 20 percent of future
fund profits, and a future 2 percent annually of
fund assets at a time when there is no value to
them from an immediate liquidation. The
managers have not performed any services yet,
and have not added any value to the investors’
contributions. They have not earned anything.
They always have zero liquidation valuation for
27
their interest.
It would be possible to find substantial value
in the fund manager’s interest at time of issuance
by looking backwards from the result. Valuation,
under the only available theory, is the net present
value of the expected future cash flows. If we
apply the known future cash flow retrospectively,
that net present value can be substantial. If, for
instance, an equity fund managers are given an
interest at start of the tax year and has
distributable cash of $1 billion from their 20-2
share by the end of the year, we can discount the
$1 billion by a reasonable risk-free discount rate,
say 5 percent, and the managers would then have
net present value of $952 million at the start of the
year, which would be ordinary compensation
income. The volatility or riskiness of results
would be met by giving those managers who end
up with nothing by year-end, a zero net present
value at the start of the year. By taxing both the up
leg and down leg of outcomes according to what
happens, we can take account of volatile possible
results and, overall for the industry, we will be
taxing expected net present value at the start of
the year, on average. Retrospective valuation both
captures what happens to any one partner and
captures the expected value.
Liquidation value, by contrast, is not value.
Yes, before any performance of services or
appreciation, the manager can expect no
distributable cash on their interest from an
immediate liquidation. They must perform, or at
least ride the market to appreciation to earn
anything. But that does not mean that manager
would willingly leave the interest out on the curb
on trash day as worthless. It is, after all, a platform

for making, for example, $l billion. Do not discard
this opportunity!
Valuing compensation when the 20-2 platform
is issued would be a bit like valuing a Stanford
MBA upon graduation. Stanford MBAs make $3
million on average in the 20 years after
graduation,28 but future salary depends on talent,
work, and happenstance as well as on education.
For those who go off to Fiji to beachcomb, die
tragically, or bet on the wrong product, the MBA
is not worth anything. Some will make much
more than $3 million. Just as it would be silly to
tax the MBA on present value at graduation on
what might be achieved, so the real value,
discounted present value of the future cash flows,
is not ascertainable on issuance of the 20-2
interests, except by retroactive taxation. The
future income has not been earned and it is not
ascertainable in amount. It has not accrued under
generally accepted accounting principles. Trying
to tax the unearned future income when the
managing partner is given the platform for future
profit would be premature and unreasonable.
Early taxation of a service interest is a terrible
way to tax compensation. The fair market value of
a service partner’s interest when issued can be
given value by the market, in bargaining between
sellers and buyers, but the value so set will be
systematically too low. Outsiders will make some
sort of assumption about the contribution the
service provider will add to the fund, but as
outsiders they need to assume the risk the
manager is a “lemon” and protect themselves by
assessing value too low.29 That means that every
service partner who is slightly better than a lemon
will add value to their share that cannot be
captured at the outset. Indeed, even if there is
some valuation for the partnership interest at the
time the service partner receives it, the
identification of compensation needs to tax some
of the subsequent gain as service-caused gain. The
initial tax cannot capture it.

28

27

Even a profits interest or capital interest with no distribution upon
immediate liquidation is taxable if the cash flows from the interest are
certain; the interest is publicly traded; or the partner is taking the interest
to sell it; but those exceptions never show up in the standard industry
practices.

John A. Byrne, “The Most Lucrative Seven-Figure MBA Degrees,”
Poets & Quants (Oct. 13, 2014), reporting findings that Stanford MBAs
make $3 million in the 20 years following graduation. This is not an
attempt to compute the value added by the degree. Stanford applicants
start with talent and connections, and they might make as much going to
Wharton or if they choose a different career.
29

The argument is a variation of George Akerlof, “The Market for
‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” 84 Q. J.
Econ. 488 (1970).
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The only rationale for not taxing a partnership
interest with no immediate liquidation value is
the open transaction rationale. If the interest is
traded on an established market, has such a
predictable cash flow so that net present value of
the cash flow is a reliable measure of value, or the
partner sells the interest soon enough after
receiving that the sale price is a reliable measure
of the value of the interest when received, the
partner has compensation from the receipt of the
interest. Whatever else might be said in favor of
not taxing partners on receipt of their interest falls
away if the value of the interest is reasonably
ascertainable. The open transaction doctrine,
however, also has a second half, which is that
when the value of the compensation is earned and
becomes ascertainable, the compensation is still
ordinary-income compensation.
It was an error for Treasury to say that the
issuance of the partnership interest is the end of
the effort to measure the manager’s
compensation. None of a manager’s subsequent
return on his partnership interest can be
attributed to capital because the manager has not
contributed any capital. Letting the manager into
the status of partner and ending the compensation
element means the manager thereafter has the lala rule of passthrough of partnership income,
with a character of whatever it is to the
partnership. The second step of the open
transaction doctrine, taxation of the compensation
when its value becomes clear, never happens.
Letting the manager have zero compensation both
at issuance of the interest and at distribution or
allocation of a distributable share of the cash that
gives the interest its value is like the loophole that
section 83 was enacted to prevent, under which
restricted stock compensation was taxed neither
when transferred nor when the restriction lapsed.
Letting the executive get out of the
compensation measurement with a zero-tax event
is the sad end of an endeavor by Treasury, over at
least two generations, to prevent premature
compensation events taxed falsely at zero value
from transforming the property from
compensation into capital gain. For generations,
compensation tax planners had asked Treasury to
value compensatory tax options as the bargain
that the option would give to the executive if the
option were exercised immediately. For options

with no initial bargain, the gain the executive
made at exercise would be capital gain and only if
sold. Treasury resisted premature taxation of
stock options, at zero “liquidation” value, for
more than two generations so to prevent
executives from paying tax zero tax on their stock
options and then reporting subsequent gain as
capital gain.30 Then the partnership people found
a way to get zero valuation by a premature taxable
event, before anything was earned, with the errors
of subchapter K partnership tax and so avoid all
compensation. This is exactly what Treasury had
resisted despite much hard lobbying for many
years.
The zero-taxed carried interest is different
from stock given as compensation when it has
value. When stock compensation is included in
income, the employee gets a basis equal to the
FMV included in income. That basis, sometimes
called “tax basis” or basis from being taxed, is like
an investment and subsequent gain on the stock
and is thereafter treated as capital gain. We treat
the executive shareholder as if they had
purchased the stock compensation for cash
because the executive could have been paid
compensation cash and purchased the shares for
their value on the open market. For outside
shareholders who have just invested the FMV for
the stock, the gain is appreciation on basis,
because of forces beyond the taxpayer’s control.
Corporate-level tax on the earnings the executive
has created is also a fine rationale for letting
subsequent shareholder gain, from the same
earnings, qualify as capital gain, even if the
shareholder-executive caused the gain.31
Partnership interests taxed at zero when
issued are not the same. The partner comes out of
30

See, e.g., reg. section 1 83-7 (2004) (stock options are taxable at
issuance usually only if sold on established market); for other attempts
to prevent premature taxation that gets into capital gain position, see
reg. section 1.83-3(a)(6); reg. section 1.83-3(a)(7), examples 2 and 4
(employee must have capital to lose or the stock is not transferred yet).
31

Sometimes stock appreciation is due at least in part to the effort of
the employee who has been given the stock compensation. But we give
shareholders capital gain on stock caused by their own efforts in part as
relief from double corporate tax. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 59-325, 1959-2 C.B.
185 (acquiescing in giving Jack Benny and Groucho Marx capital gain on
sale of stock holding assets that amounted just to the comedians’
services). Once the corporation has paid tax on the earnings the
shareholder caused, it is reasonable to give lower tax on the stock to
ameliorate double tax of corporate income at both the corporate and
shareholder levels. See, e.g., section 1(h)(11) (giving capital gain for
corporate dividends). For the fund manager, however, getting a
partnership interest is not subject to double corporate tax.
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the issuance with zero basis or capital. Zero basis
cannot explain the future returns as a return on
capital invested. The partner has no basis, no
capital invested. It is all return to services
provided — that is, compensation.
If the managing partner pays tax on interim
distributable partnership income, but does not
withdraw it, the managing partner does have a
separate interest in the partnership, which is not a
compensatory interest and not part of the
ordinary-income closing of the compensatory
open transaction. Taxed but undistributed income
is like basis achieved by purchase. A partner has
32
basis in distributable income not distributed.
Basis in the distributable but undistributed claim
on earned amounts is justification for treating the
subsequent income, if any, earned on that claim as
return on capital, including if the return on the
capital is tax-exempt bonds or tax-favored capital
gain.
If a partner has both basis from a capital
investment, or a basis from prior tax, and also a
claim derived from services performed,
one should worry that the manager in charge can
claim too large a return of capital when the claim
is really attributable to his continuing services.
The investors would not object given the services.
Still an agreement that gives the managing
partner a return on capital accounts that is no
larger than what the partnership has made overall
for the year would not seem to be abusive, if
nothing else is going on.
The principle that compensation is ordinary
income is a strong one. Compensation is the
normative heart of the income tax. Current law to
the contrary needs to be fixed. The system for
fixing it needs to be clean in theory and clear, but
current law does need to be fixed. Finishing up
the open transaction doctrine, as required by the
logic of the doctrine, would reach the income — as
it is earned — as ordinary income. Even better,
section 702 needs to be amended so that capital
gain on the partnership level will not
mischaracterize compensation for partner
services. The Kahns, while explaining rationales
for current law, do not justify the capital gain
result.

32

Section 705(a)(1)(A).

A Response to the Defense of Eliminating
Capital Gains Treatment for Carried Interest
by Jeffrey H. Kahn and Douglas A. Kahn
We recently published an article
demonstrating that the current tax treatment of
carried interests, under which some partnership
distributions to the holders of those interests are
characterized as capital gains, is proper as a
matter of good tax policy.33 We contended that the
widespread antagonism to that tax treatment was
wrong and based on a failure to account for the
nature of a partnership and the proper
characterization of partnership distributions for
federal tax purposes. We refer to that article as
“Fallacious Objections.” Calvin H. Johnson has
written an article in response (see above), which
we refer to as the “Erroneous Defense article.” In
that article, Johnson does not dispute that current
tax law treats the distributions in question as
capital gains, and he graciously acknowledges
that Fallacious Objections provides a fair
description of the rationale for the current law.
However, Johnson maintains that the current
treatment offends good tax policy and should be
changed. As one might expect, we disagree and
will seek to show in this article that Johnson’s
thesis does not withstand scrutiny.
Before discussing the Erroneous Defense
article, we briefly describe what constitutes
carried interest and the basis of our contention
that the current tax treatment of carried interests
is consistent with tax policy. The support for our
position is more fully set forth in Fallacious
Objections.
I. The Meaning of Carried Interest
A carried interest is the term used to describe
a profits interest in a partnership that invests in
equities. Typically, the partnership will be a
limited partnership or a limited liability company
to which several investors will contribute capital
in exchange for a partnership capital interest. A
“partnership capital interest” refers to a
partnership interest that provides rights to both
the properties that were contributed to the

33

Kahn and Kahn, supra note 1.
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partnership and to the profits earned by the
partnership. A “partnership profits interest”
refers to a partnership interest that provides
rights only to the subsequent profits earned by the
partnership and does not provide rights to the
capital that was contributed by the investors. The
partnership will invest in equities to be selected
by one partner, called here managing partner,
who has expertise in investing. The managing
partner contributes little or no capital to the
partnership. Instead, he contributes the right to
his future services in managing the investments in
exchange for which he receives a partnership
profits interest. In many cases, the partnership
invests in depressed companies, and the
managing partner uses his expertise to turn those
companies around so that they can be sold for a
substantial profit. The profit from the sale of the
stock of those companies will be treated as capital
gains. Typically, the partnership profits interest
that the managing partner receives in exchange
for his promise to perform future services
provides for a right to 20 percent of the
partnership’s future profits.34 The 20 percent
partnership profits interest that the managing
partner holds is referred to as a carried interest.
II. The Thesis of Fallacious Objections
The distributions made by a partnership to its
partners have the same character to the partners
that the income from which the distributions were
made had to the partnership.35 To the extent that a
distribution to a partner is attributable to what
was long-term capital gain to the partnership, it
will be characterized as long-term capital gain to
36
that partner. Because most of the amounts
distributed to the partners of an equity
investment partnership will be attributable to
long-term capital gain income of the partnership,

34

Also, the managing partner usually receives an annual fee of 2
percent of partnership profits to compensate for his services. That fee
will be treated as ordinary income to the managing partner.
35

Section 702(b). It is not the distributions from the partnership that
are taxable to a partner. The partnership’s income is allocated among the
partners at the end of the partnership taxable year regardless of whether
any distributions were received by the partner. Section 702(a). But, the
source of the objections to carried interest is that the managing partner
receives partnership distributions and is taxed at capital gains rates. For
convenience, we refer to the partnership distributions as the source of
the capital gains treatment.

most of the distributions to its partners will be
treated as long-term capital gains. So, most of the
distributions of 20 percent of the partnership’s
profits to the managing partner will constitute
long-term capital gains to that partner. It is that
characterization of the managing partner’s
distribution as capital gains to which Johnson and
others object.
Our thesis in support of the current treatment
of the partnership distributions to a managing
partner rests on two elements. One element is that
not all the income produced from a person’s labor
is treated as ordinary income. In many cases, such
income is treated as capital gains. An important
example of that treatment arises when a person
invests in an item and then expends considerable
labor to improve the item before selling it (socalled sweat equity). The completed item is
sometimes called “self-created property.” The
gain on the sale of self-created property is partly
attributable to the capital contributed by the seller
in his purchase of the item and partly attributable
to the seller’s labor. For example, Helen puts
considerable time and effort into researching
companies before investing in their stocks. She
later sells the stocks for a sizable profit that is
partly attributable to the capital she invested and
partly to her labor. Yet, all the profit Helen earned
on the sales is a capital gain.
The second element rests on how both state
business law and federal tax law treat
partnerships. For some purposes, a partnership is
treated as an entity separate from its partners. For
some other purposes, a partnership is treated as a
fiction representing the aggregate interests of the
several partners. For purposes of characterizing
the income recognized by a partner because of an
allocation to him of the partnership’s income, the
partnership is treated as an entity and the
partner’s income is characterized at the
partnership level. The concept of a partnership is
that several persons combine their capital and
labor in the hope that the synergy will produce
more income than their investments or efforts
would produce if they acted alone. The profits
that are earned are not income of each partner;

36

Id.
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rather they are the partnership’s income as a
separate entity. Each partner is taxed on his share
of the partnership’s annual income regardless of
37
whether it is distributed to him or her. A partner
is not taxed on a partnership distribution except
to the extent that cash is distributed in excess of
38
the partner’s basis in his partnership interest. So
even if no distribution is made to a partner, he will
be taxed on his share of the partnership’s income
for that year. For convenience, we refer to the
distributions the managing partner receives as the
source of the capital gains treatment.
The partnership income allocable to a
managing partner is not compensation for work
that she performed. The payment she received for
her services was the receipt of the partnership
profits interest she acquired on the formation of
the partnership. The partnership income that is
allocated to her is income earned by the property
interest she holds (that is, her partnership profits
interest). The partner acquired her partnership
interest in exchange for her agreement to provide
services to the partnership.39 The partnership
profits interest constitutes an advance payment
for those services.
A proposed regulation promulgated in 2005
states that the receipt of a partnership profits
interest is a taxable event to the recipient under
40
section 83. Previously, after some litigation, the
41
IRS ruled in Rev. Proc. 93-27 that the receipt of a
partnership profits interest for services is not
income to the recipient unless one of several
exceptions applied. While, if finalized, the 2005
proposed regulations would replace that ruling,
the ultimate result reached by the 2005 proposed
regulations would be similar. That is because the
2005 proposed regulations establish a safe harbor
under which the value of a partnership profits
interest will be deemed equal to its liquidation
value if some requisites are satisfied.42 Since the
holder of a partnership profits interest has no

37

Sections 702(a), 704.

38

Section 731(a).

39

The arrangement often provides that the service provider will
receive an additional amount for her services, but her primary
compensation is the receipt of the partnership profits interest.
40

Prop. reg. section 1.721-1(b)(1).

41

Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343.

42

Prop. reg. section 1.83-3(l). See also Notice 2005-43, 2005-1 C.B. 1221.

rights to the capital contributed to the partnership
and since a newly formed partnership has not yet
earned any profits, the liquidation value of the
managing partner’s partnership profits interest is
zero. For that reason, under either Rev. Proc. 93-27
or the 2005 proposed regulations, the recipient of
a carried interest will not incur any tax liability. As
we will see, Johnson proposes that that rule be
changed.
III. A Critique of Johnson’s Thesis
The principal targets of criticism of carried
interests are hedge fund managers and equity
fund and venture capital fund managers. Those
who are successful in those fields receive large
sums of money that are taxed at capital gains
rates. Johnson and others consider this a loophole
that should be closed. The sizable amounts
involved incite their ire.
Johnson emphasizes that compensation for
services should never be taxed at capital gains
rates. We have no quarrel with that proposition.
The difficulty is in determining what constitutes
compensation for services. We will elaborate on
that point later in this article.
A. Compensation for Services
The thrust of Johnson’s position rests on his
characterization of partnership distributions to
managing partners as compensation for their
services. Indeed, that is the common theme of all
those who dislike the capital gains treatment for
carried interests. As noted in our Fallacious
Objections article, while that characterization has
some superficial appeal, it is fundamentally
wrong. The amounts received by the managing
partners are a return on property they hold and
are not compensation for their services. The
following examples illustrate the error in
characterizing those payments as compensation.
Example 1: Several investors form the XYZ
limited partnership to invest in the stock of startup companies and sell for a profit the stocks of
those companies that succeed. Garry and Sheila
are lawyers. The XYZ partnership hires Garry and
Sheila to perform legal services for the
partnership. As compensation for their services,
the partnership gives limited partnership profits
interests in XYZ to Garry and Sheila. Those
partnership interests are not forfeitable. Shortly
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thereafter, Garry and Sheila form a partnership
(the GS partnership) to invest in start-up
companies. They approach Hilda and seek to hire
her to manage their investments. The parties
come to an agreement under which Garry and
Sheila transfer to Hilda their partnership profits
interests in the XYZ partnership in exchange for
Hilda’s agreement to manage the GS partnership’s
investments for 10 years. The value of the XYZ
partnership interests that were transferred to
Hilda is minimal because they provide no interest
in contributed capital and the amount of the
partnership’s future income is speculative. Thus,
the amount of Hilda’s income from receiving
those XYZ partnership interests is relatively
small. The XYZ partnership proves to be
successful and earns large amounts of long-term
capital gains, which it distributes to Hilda and its
other partners. Clearly, the distributions Hilda
received from XYZ are not compensation for her
services. She performed no services for XYZ. The
compensation for her services was the receipt of
the XYZ limited partnership profits interests. The
distributions she received from the partnership
are a return on her partnership interest and are
taxed at capital gains rates. The same principle
applies to the distributions to a managing partner.
In the case of carried interest, the partnership that
distributes its capital gains is also the one for
whom the managing partner performs services,
but just as in the XYZ situation, the payment for
those services was the transfer of a partnership
profits interest, and the subsequent distributions
were returns on that partnership interest.
Example 2: Alex and Paul form a subchapter S
corporation to invest in start-up companies. In
exchange for their cash contributions to the
corporation, they each receive stock and bonds of
the corporation. The face amount of the bonds
constitutes 85 percent of the amount contributed
by the shareholders, and the value of the bonds
equals their face amount. Thus, the value of the
stock equals 15 percent of the amount that was
contributed. The corporation wishes to use the
services of Katherine to manage its investments.
The corporation and Katherine agree that in
exchange for her managing the corporation’s
investments, Katherine will receive stock in the
corporation constituting 20 percent of the
corporation’s outstanding stock. The value of the

stock that Katherine receives is ordinary income
to her; but because of the corporation’s
outstanding debt, the amount of her income is
43
relatively small. The investments are successful,
and the corporation earns substantial capital
gains from selling them. The capital gain income
of an S corporation passes through to its
shareholders at the end of the corporation’s
taxable year regardless of whether it is
44
distributed. Thus, Katherine’s 20 percent share of
the corporation’s capital gains is taxed to her as
capital gain income at the end of the year in which
the gains are earned. Katherine’s situation is
almost identical to that of a managing partner
except that Katherine will have ordinary income
on the value of the stock when she receives it. But,
the value of the stock is small so there is little
practical difference in the situations. Indeed, if the
2005 proposed regulations are finalized, the
receipt of a partnership profits interest will be
income to the managing partner, but because of
the zero valuation provided by the safe harbor
rule, he would usually incur no tax liability. There
is little practical difference between having a
small value for the stock and a zero value for the
partnership interest. In principle, both are
included in income at their respective values.
Johnson states that the receipt of stock is different
because the service provider gets a tax basis in the
stock equal to the amount of income (that is, the
value of the stock). Having a tax basis is
equivalent to making an investment, and so
Johnson apparently agrees that the return on that
investment when Katherine receives her share of
the corporation’s capital gains qualifies as capital
gains. Therefore, if the IRS were to value a
compensatory partnership profits interest at a
figure greater than liquidation value, no matter
how small, the managing partner would have a
basis in his partnership interest. Johnson would
agree that he would then qualify for capital gain
treatment for partnership allocations to him.
Johnson’s proposal to have a substantial
difference in tax consequences turn on the

43

Katherine’s stock represents 20 percent of the 15 percent of the
amount contributed to the contribution by Alex and Paul. Thus, the
value of her stock is 3 percent of the total amount contributed to the
corporation. The reference to “contributed” in this footnote includes the
amount paid by the shareholders to purchase bonds of the corporation.
44

Section 1366(a), (b).

TAX NOTES, DECEMBER 11, 2017

1609
For more Tax Notes content, please visit www.taxnotes.com.

© 2017 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

DEBATING TAX

minuscule difference between having a zero basis
in the appreciated property and having a minimal
basis appears to us to be impractical and affords
great consequence to insignificant differences.
It should be noted that Johnson buttressed his
view for allowing capital gain treatment for the
sale of stock in that it mitigates the double
taxation that otherwise would apply. While
double taxation does not occur in the case of S
corporations, the principle the Erroneous Defense
article espouses that having a basis in property is
a justification for allowing capital gains treatment
would apply to stock of an S corporation as well.
Moreover, Johnson agrees that if the partnership
profits interest were taxable to the managing
partner when he receives it, the treatment of
partnership distributions as capital gains would
be appropriate. Ultimately, Johnson’s position is
that the qualification for capital gains treatment
depends upon whether the managing partner has
or is deemed to have an investment in the
partnership interest. We discuss that issue later in
this article.
It is noteworthy that if the 2005 proposed
regulations concerning the receipt of a
compensatory partnership interest are finalized,
the adoption of Johnson’s proposal would not
make a significant change to the tax consequences
of holding a carried interest. The 2005 proposed
regulations provide a safe harbor in accordance
with which the value of a compensatory
partnership profits interest is deemed to be its
liquidation value. But this safe harbor provision
applies only if specific conditions are satisfied and
45
if it is elected by the partnership and its partners.
Since Johnson’s proposed open transaction
approach does not apply if the receipt of the
partnership interest is taxable, a partnership
could simply not elect the safe harbor, and the
partnership interest would then be taxable to the
managing partner. The value of the partnership
interest is likely to be small especially in light of
the power of the investing partners to terminate
the partnership and leave the managing partner
with little or nothing. Thus, for a relatively small
tax cost, the managing partner would continue to

45

Prop. reg. section 1 83-3(l).

qualify for capital gain treatment for his share of
partnership income.
B. Exchange of Services
Johnson correctly notes that the exchange of
services for the services of another (or for
property) is a taxable exchange in which both
service providers can have ordinary income.
From that rule, he concludes that a managing
partner should have ordinary income because he
is providing services for another and not for
46
himself. He concludes that if subchapter K
provides otherwise, it is flawed. He states that
“Subchapter K . . . is supposed to be the servant of
substantive tax law.” The problem with that
approach is that the tax law operates in
conjunction with property laws and other private
laws. The nature of a partnership is a joint
enterprise in which the individuality of the
partners is merged to some extent in the entity. A
partner who performs services in his partnership
capacity is not considered to be performing it for
the other partners. He is performing it for the joint
enterprise of which he is a member. Consider the
following example:
Example 3: John is an architect and Ralph is a
builder. They form a partnership to construct an
apartment building. John designs the building
and creates blueprints for its construction. Ralph
conducts the construction of the property. They
are not treated as exchanging service with each
other. Instead, they are treated as performing
services in the joint enterprise of creating a
building. They do not recognize income from the
performance of their services. If, several years
after completing the construction, they decided to
sell the building for a gain, they would have
section 1231 income, which likely will be treated
as long-term capital gains. Even though much of
the gain is attributable to the labor that they both
contributed, their income may be taxed at capital
gains rates. If the partners had managed the
apartments so well as to increase the value of the
building because of its positive reputation, the
gain attributable to that labor also would be
treated as section 1231 gain.

46

Subchapter K (sections 701-755) deals with partnership taxation.
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Similarly, the services performed by a
managing partner are for the joint enterprise of
acquiring stocks for future appreciation. The
services are not performed for the investors. It is
common for some partners to contribute capital to
a partnership, other partners to contribute
services, and some partners to contribute both.
The income from the partnership as an entity is
divided among the partners and characterized as
it is in the hands of the partnership. That aspect of
partnership taxation conforms to the private
business law view of a partnership as a joint
enterprise.
In the Erroneous Defense article, Johnson
states that, “The fund managers are not building
for themselves, however, but for others.” He
disregards the partnership’s significance and
treats it as a mere arrangement to turn
compensation income into capital gains which he
refers to as a kind of alchemy. To the contrary, the
carried interest partnerships are not mere devices
to obtain favorable tax consequences. They are
formed for legitimate business purposes. The
investors believe and expect that the synergy of
their investments and the expertise of the
managing partner will produce greater profits
than they would obtain if they invested alone. Not
all those investments will be successful, but many
are. It is not the function of the courts, the IRS, or
academics to second-guess the business decisions
that the investors made. Of course, the tax
consequences of doing business in a partnership
form is taken into account by the parties. That is
commonly done in choosing the type of entity in
which to conduct a business. If carried interest
partnerships were not formed for legitimate
business purposes, they would not qualify as a
business entity for tax purposes and would not be
treated as a partnership under the tax law
regardless of how classified for local law
purposes.47
Johnson states, “a partner performing services
is an agent of the partnership, just as an employee,
officer, or independent contractor is an agent of
the business for whom the services are provided.”
It is true that a partner is an agent for purposes of
being able to bind the partnership to agreements

he makes on its behalf and in making the
partnership liable for his negligence and poor
decisions. But the partner is also a member of the
partnership and is treated as self-employed. The
partnership for whom he acts is an entity that
consists of a melding of several persons, one of
whom is the managing partner. When acting in
his capacity as a partner, the partner is not treated
as providing services for compensation but rather
as performing his duties as a member of the
partnership.
It is possible for a partner to perform services
for a partnership for compensation. If a partner
performs services that are not done in his capacity
as a partner, the transaction will be treated as if it
were between the partnership and someone
48
unrelated to it. For example, if Paula is an
attorney and a partner in a real estate partnership
that becomes engaged in litigation, and if the
partnership hires Paula to represent it in the
litigation, Paula would not be providing her legal
services in her capacity as a partner. In that case,
the payments made to her for her services would
be treated as compensation. The payments would
be ordinary income to Paula and, depending
upon the nature of the litigation, could be
deductible by the partnership. That provision
does not apply to managing partners since they
provide their services in their capacity as
partners.
There is one situation in which the payments
made for services provided by a partner in that
capacity are treated as compensation for some
purposes. If the payment must be made without
regard to whether the partnership has income, it
is referred to as a “guaranteed payment.” A
guaranteed payment is ordinary income to the
partner who receives it and, depending on the
nature of the services, may be deductible by the
partnership.49 Guaranteed payment treatment
applies only to payments to the extent that they
are not dependent on the partnership’s income.
For example, if the partnership agreement
required that a partner be paid $20,000 annually,
regardless of whether the partnership has income
in that year, that would be a guaranteed payment.

48
47

Reg. section 1.7701-1(a).

49

Section 707(a)(1).
Section 707(c).
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This provision does not apply if the payments to
the service provider are based on a portion of the
partnership’s income. A managing partner has no
guaranty of a specified amount of payment, but
rather receives a percentage of the income earned
by the partnership. The guaranteed payment
provision does not apply to carried interests. Note
that guaranteed payments do not treat the
partner’s services as having been performed for
the other partners, but rather for the partnership
as an entity.
The concept of a guaranteed payment was
first adopted in the 1954 code. Before that,
those payments were treated as partnership
50
distributions rather than compensation. The
courts had difficulty dealing with that treatment
when the partnership’s income was less than the
amount distributed. Congress adopted the
guaranteed payment provision to clarify the
51
treatment of such cases. The concept is based on
the fact that partners share in the income and
losses of the partnership. If the amount that a
partner receives is not determined by partnership
income, it looks more like a payment for services
than an allocation of partnership profits.
C. The Scope of Capital Gains
There is no consensus on the function and
purpose of capital gains treatment. It can be seen
as serving multiple purposes. Johnson strongly
adheres to the view that capital gain is restricted
to appreciation of capital. Even if that is so, the
managing partner’s “capital” is his partnership
interest. Regardless of whether he has any basis in
that interest, it is an item of property and thus is
capital that can appreciate. The investment of
money is not a condition of having capital. For
example, Ralph inherits the property of his
grandmother upon her demise. Among her
properties, there is an old baseball. From all facts
known at that time, the baseball is worthless, and
52
so Ralph has a zero basis in the ball. Since Ralph

50

See Lloyd v. Commissioner, 15 B.T.A. 82, 84-85 (1929).

51

Congress determined that the pre-1954 treatment of such payments
was “unrealistic and unnecessarily complicated.” H.R. Rep. No. 83-1337
at 68 (1954). See Douglas A. Kahn, “Proposed Regulatory Change of
Treatment of a Guaranteed Payment from a Partnership to a Partner,” 5
Mich. Bus. & Entrepreneurial L. Rev. 125, 130-131 (2016).
52

Section 1014(a).

has no positive basis in the ball, Johnson would
say that he has no investment in it. Five years
later, it is discovered from records recently
unearthed that the ball was the last home run that
Babe Ruth hit. The ball then is seen as a collector’s
item, and Ralph sells it for $100,000. There is no
reason that the gain from that sale should not be
capital gain. If Ralph had purchased the ball for $1
at a flea market, the ball would not be more of a
capital asset than it was as an inherited item.
Johnson appears to agree that if Ralph had
purchased the ball at a flea market for $1, he
would have a capital gain of $99,999 on its sale.
But he contends that if he inherited the ball with a
zero value, he would have ordinary income of
$100,000 on its sale. It seems also that Johnson
would agree that if the ball were deemed to have
a value of $1 when Ralph inherited it, he would
have had a basis of $1 in the ball and so could have
a capital gain of $99,999 on its sale. His positions
are based on his contention that capital gain can
apply only if the taxpayer has an investment in
the item. He equates a positive basis with an
investment, and so the presence of a basis
becomes the crucial element for capital gains
treatment according to his theory. Even if one
were to accept that view, it is wrong to equate a
zero basis with no basis. If an inherited asset is
valued at zero, it is still an asset with a basis of
zero that can increase in value. Johnson’s
willingness to have a substantial difference in tax
consequences turn on the minuscule difference
between having a zero basis in the appreciated
property and having a minimal basis appears to
us to be more doctrinaire than principled.
In the Erroneous Defense article, Johnson
states that, “Under current law, without basis, the
gain from compensation is not the appreciation of
capital, and is not capital gain.” This statement is
made in support of treating a property interest
received for services as capital only if the
property’s value is taxable when received so that
the recipient has a positive basis in it. In footnote
8, the article cites two cases for that proposition
(Vestal and Bryan), and neither of those cases is
apposite. The Erroneous Defense article states
53
that Vestal held that the sale of a partnership

53

Vestal v. United States, 498 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1974).
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interest with zero basis was compensation, not
capital gain. The case does not support that
statement. In Vestal, the taxpayer had a
contractual right to receive a transfer of a portion
of the partnership interests that several limited
partners held but only if specific conditions were
satisfied. This contractual right was given as a fee
for finding the investment. The conditions for
transferring the partnership interests were never
satisfied, and so the taxpayer never acquired a
partnership interest. Instead, when the
partnership interests of the partners were sold,
the taxpayer received cash payments from those
limited partners. The court held that the
payments were made in accordance with a
contract, not as a sale of a partnership interest.
The Bryan54 citation is even more puzzling. The
case involved the sale of corporate stock, and the
gain recognized on the sale was treated as capital
gain.
Johnson contends that the profits from an item
produced by a taxpayer’s labor should be
classified as compensation and, as a matter of tax
policy, should be treated as ordinary income. He
considers the failure to treat self-created property
that way to be an exception that is allowed for
administrative convenience. He points to the
provision of the code treating gains from the sale
of self-created literary and some similar items as
ordinary income as evidence that taxing selfcreated property at capital gains rates is a
loophole. Let us examine the current treatment of
profits from a taxpayer’s creations.
As Johnson notes, in the late 1940s, General
Eisenhower sold the copyright to a book he
authored, and the gain was taxed at capital gain
rates. At that time, the sale of a self-created book
or other composition by a person who was not a
professional author could qualify for capital gain
treatment. Congress later adopted section
1221(a)(3) excluding from capital asset
classification a copyright, literary, musical, or
artistic composition created by the taxpayer.
Johnson maintains that the adoption of that

provision shows that Congress considered an
allowance of capital gains treatment for any self55
created property to be a loophole. Conflicting
with that view is the fact that Congress required
ordinary income treatment only for several
expressly listed types of self-created properties
and left untouched all the others. If all self-created
property should be excluded from capital gains
treatment, why exclude only a few types? For
example, a patent obtained for an invention is not
included in the list in section 1221(a)(3) of items
excluded from capital asset classification. Thus, a
one-time inventor could sell the patent on his
invention for capital gains. Not only did Congress
leave patents off its list of excluded items, it left
intact section 1235, a provision that allows a
professional inventor (a modern-day Thomas
Edison) to obtain capital gains treatment for a sale
of his patents. Indeed, section 1235 applies capital
gain treatment to the sale of patents far more
liberally in several respects than is applied to the
56
sale of items that are not self-created.
In 2006 Congress added section 1221(b)(3),
which grants taxpayers an election to have capital
gains treatment for the sale or exchange of selfcreated musical compositions. Since that
amendment was adopted, the composer of a
musical composition can sell it for capital gains
even if he is a professional composer.
Clearly, Congress considers one function of
capital gains treatment to be to encourage specific
behavior. When dealing with investments, capital
gain treatment encourages more investment
because some of the profits can be taxed at lower
rates. It is false that Congress has no interest in
encouraging labor in some areas. Apparently,
Congress deems it desirable to encourage
inventions and musical compositions, but cares
little for literary works. Self-created works require
an investment of labor. There are ample reasons to
encourage the creation of goods from labor just as
there are reasons to encourage the creation of
goods from the contribution of capital. In the case
of hedge funds or venture capital funds, the
acquisition of a distressed business to restructure
it into a successful and profitable operation can be
55

The Erroneous Defense article cites a committee report that
characterized the prior treatment as a “loophole.”
54

Bryan v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 972 (1951).

56

Section 1235(a)(1).
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seen as a worthy enterprise to be encouraged. The
change from a failing operation to a successful
one benefits the public as well as those who
invested in it.
In any event, in the case of carried interests,
the capital gains are earned by the partnership as
the product of the combination of the capital it
acquired from its partners and the expertise of its
managing partner. The gain resembles that of selfcreated property in that it is the product of the
capital and labor contributed by its partners; there
is no dispute that the partnership’s gain is a
capital gain. The partnership interest that the
managing partner holds is not self-created
property; it is property received as an advance
payment for services to be performed.
The allowance of capital gain treatment for
carried interests is not an outlier from the other
properties that qualify. The treatment of carried
interests comports with the partnership concept
that was adopted by state laws and the federal tax
law and is consistent with the capital gains
treatment accorded throughout the tax law.
D. Income Exclusion of Partnership Interest
The Erroneous Defense article asserts that the
core of the problem with the current treatment of
carried interest is the failure to tax the managing
partner on the receipt of a partnership profits
interest. If the managing partner paid a tax on the
receipt of that partnership interest, Johnson
agrees that subsequent capital gain treatment is
appropriate. Let us now consider the exclusion
from income tax liability of the receipt of a
partnership profits interest and its significance to
the treatment of subsequent partnership
distributions or allocations.
For federal tax purposes, the value of property
is “the price at which the property would change
hands between a willing buyer and a willing
seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy
or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of
57
relevant facts.” Johnson notes correctly that
while the liquidation value of a carried interest at
the time it is received is zero, the actual market
value of the interest at that time is greater than
zero. However speculative the success of the

57

Reg. section 1.170A-1(c)(2).

venture may be, someone surely would pay
something for the prospect of making a profit.
However, the amount they would pay is likely to
be small, not because the prospects of gain are
poor, but because the other partners have the
power to cause the termination of the partnership
and leave the managing partner’s interest with
nothing more than the amount distributed on it in
liquidation of the partnership (that is, a zero
amount). It is unlikely that the other partners
would promptly terminate the partnership, and
so the carried interest does have value, but the
transfer of that interest to a third party increases
the risk that the partnership would be terminated,
especially if, as often is the case, the carried
interest is a general partnership interest. That risk
of termination will reduce the market value of the
carried interest, but it does not reduce it to zero.
In the 1931 Supreme Court decision Burnet v.
58
Logan, the Court dealt with the sale of stock for
which payment was to be made in installments
based on the amount of iron ore mined and sold
under a lease arrangement. Because of the
difficulty in determining how much ore would be
mined, the Court agreed with the taxpayer that
the sale should be kept open and the taxpayer
should treat each subsequent installment
payment as a return of her basis. Once her basis
was fully recovered, payments received in excess
of her basis would be treated as capital gain
recognized from the sale of her stock. The Court
determined that the taxpayer’s right to
installment payments had no “ascertainable fair
market value” and so was not equivalent to cash.
This treatment is sometimes referred to as the
“open transaction rule,” the “open transaction
approach,” or the “cost recovery method.”
The IRS resisted the taxpayer’s contention to
keep the transaction open in Burnet. While it lost
that case, the IRS has severely restricted the scope
of the open transaction approach. The IRS’s
position is that the FMV of an asset can be
ascertained in almost all situations, and so the
open transaction approach will apply only in rare
circumstances. Reg. section 1.1001-1(a) states,
“The fair market value of property is a question of
fact, but only in rare and extraordinary cases will

58

Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931).

1614

TAX NOTES, DECEMBER 11, 2017
For more Tax Notes content, please visit www.taxnotes.com.

© 2017 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

DEBATING TAX

property be considered to have no FMV.” The rare
and extraordinary standard has been used by
59
60
both the IRS and the courts. Courts usually
adopt the IRS’s position and assign value to items
even though the amounts to be received are
61
speculative. For example, in Fleming, the court
upheld a valuation of a right to receive payments
based on a percentage of oil produced from wells
— both existing and those planned to be built. In
62
Clodfelter, the court upheld the Tax Court’s
valuation of a right to receive a percentage of the
income from the operation of a hotel. The Ninth
Circuit went even further and held that the open
transaction doctrine applies only if there is
uncertainty regarding whether the taxpayer will
recognize a gain; if it is clear that the taxpayer will
recognize a gain, the court said, there is no
63
requirement of ascertainable value.
Treasury’s resistance to the open transaction
approach is appropriate and justified. The open
transaction’s use of subsequent installment
payments as representing the FMV of the item at
the time that it was sold is unrealistic. Congress
illustrated its distaste for that approach when it
adopted the Installment Sales Revision Act of
1980.64 That act amended the code to permit
installment reporting when the amount to be
received by the seller cannot be readily
ascertained because the amount is contingent.65 In
those cases, if the installment method of reporting
is elected, the seller’s basis is allocated ratably
among the subsequent payments as contrasted to
the cost recovery method used by the open
66
transaction approach. Because of that
amendment, the open transaction rule applies to
even rarer circumstances.

59

Rev. Rul. 58-402, 1958-2 C.B. 15.

60

See, e.g., Estate of Marsak v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1961)
(in valuing patent rights, the court said that while ascertainment of value
may be difficult, it is only in rare cases that no value can be found). But
see Dorsey v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 606 (1968) in which the Tax Court held
that rights to the profits from exploitation of a patent had no
ascertainable value.
61

Fleming v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1946).

62

Clodfelter v. Commissioner, 426 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1970).

63

Tribune Publishing Co. v. United States, 836 F 2d 1176 (9th Cir. 1988).

The Burnet open transaction rule does not
apply to the carried interest situation. In Burnet,
the taxpayer received the right to installment
payments on the sale of her stock, and the amount
of those installment payments was determined by
reference to a percentage of iron ore that was
mined. The taxpayer did not receive an interest in
the mine itself or in a lease of the mine. In contrast,
the capital gain income that is distributed to a
managing partner does not constitute installment
payments on a sale of his services; instead, the
gains are a return on the property (the partnership
interest) that the taxpayer acquired as an advance
payment for his services. Similarly, in Dorsey67 the
taxpayer was entitled to installment payments
from a sale of a patent, the payments measured by
reference to a percentage of the income produced
by the patent. The taxpayer did not have an
interest in the patent itself. Even if the open
transaction rule applied to carried interests, it
would not affect the tax characterization of the
managing partner’s receipt of partnership
distributions. The rule would not treat the
managing partner’s partnership interest as
nonexistent. The distributions received on that
partnership interest would be treated as such and
not as deferred payments for the acquisition of the
right to the partner’s services.
Moreover, Rev. Proc. 93-27, which is still
viable since the 2005 proposed regulations have
not yet been finalized, provides that, with three
exceptions, the recipient of a partnership profits
interest for services does not recognize income.
Thus, there is no basis for treating subsequent
distributions from the partnership as gain
recognized by the partner from his agreement to
perform those services.
A finalization of the 2005 proposed
regulations would not change that result. The
2005 proposed regulations do treat the receipt of
the partnership profits interest as a taxable
transaction, but those regulations allow an
election to use the liquidation value of the
partnership interest as its market value. As noted
previously, the liquidation value is likely to be
zero. That does not mean that the partnership
interest has no readily ascertainable market value.

64

P.L. 96-471.

65

Section 453(f)(8)(B), (j)(2).

66

Section 453(j)(2).

67

Dorsey, 49 T.C. 606.
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To the contrary, it has a market value, and that
value is to be treated as zero.
The Erroneous Defense article notes that the
IRS has sought to apply an open transaction
approach to many stock options that were
received as payment for services. Options,
especially stock options, were previously used as
a device to compensate employees in such
manner as to minimize their tax consequences.
The options were valued at a low figure when
issued and then no gain was recognized if the
option was exercised at a highly favorable strike
price. The options might also be encumbered by
restrictions and conditions designed to lower
their market value. The IRS and Treasury took a
dim view of that practice and took steps to
prevent it. Also, Congress adopted section 83 to
deal with a similar compensatory scheme.
The IRS’s treatment of options is an exception
to the its usual position. Reg. section 1.83-7(a)
states that the granting of an option for services
will be a taxable event unless the option does not
have a readily ascertainable fair market value.
Reg. section 1.83-7(b)(1) states that the value of an
option “ordinarily” is not readily ascertainable
unless the option is actively traded on an
established market. Even if not traded on an
established market, an option will have a readily
ascertainable FMV if the conditions of reg. section
1.83-7(b)(2) are satisfied. If the option does not
have a readily ascertainable FMV, a type of open
transaction applies and the taxpayer is taxed
under section 83 when the option is disposed of or
exercised.69
The treatment of options has no bearing on
how to treat the distributions received on a
partnership profits interest. The amounts taxed to
the holder of an option are amounts received on
the disposition of the option either by a sale or by
exercising it. The distributions received by a
managing partner are not from a disposition of
the partnership interest, but rather are a return on
that property. The managing partner continues to
own and hold the partnership interest, which is
not diminished by the distribution. Also, as noted
above, the open transaction rule does not apply to

those distributions because of Rev. Proc. 93-27 and
the 2005 proposed regulations.
In his article, Johnson states, “The only
rationale for not taxing a partnership interest with
no immediate liquidation value is the open
transaction rationale.” That the liquidation value
of a carried interest is zero when it is received
does not of itself trigger the open transaction
approach. The requirement for applying that
approach is that the property not have a readily
ascertainable value; it does not matter that the
ascertained value is zero, $1, or $1 million. The
regulations under section 83 eliminate any doubt
that a zero value does not trigger the open
transaction rule.
Section 83(a) provides that the FMV of
property transferred to a service provider for the
latter’s services is taxable to the service provider
at the first time that the property either is
transferable or is not subject to a risk of forfeiture.
Section 83 applies only to a transfer of property
made to compensate for services performed.
Section 83(b) grants the service provider an
election to have the transferred property valued
and taxed at the time of the transfer, in which case
any restrictions on the property are ignored in
valuing it. Neither section 83(a) nor 83(b) applies
to a transfer at the time it is made if the transferred
70
property has no readily ascertainable value. The
election under section 83(b) can be made even
when the service provider pays FMV for the
property so that there is no bargain element in the
71
transfer. In such a case, the transferred property
effectively was partly sold and partly transferred
72
as payment for services. Since section 83 applies
only if property is transferred to a service
provider as compensation for services, the
regulation’s application of section 83(b) to the
transaction means that Treasury considers there
to have been a transfer of property to the service
provider for his services. Because the recipient
paid market value for the property, there was no
distribution of that part of the property, and there

70

Reg. section 1.83-7(a).

71

Reg. section 1.83-2. The purpose of making the election is to
prevent the application of section 83(a) to any appreciation of the
property that is recognized on a subsequent disposition of it.
72

69

Reg. section 1.83-7(a).

Section 83(b) can apply only if there is deemed to be a transfer of
property to the service provider as compensation for services.
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had to be a deemed distribution of a portion of the
property to the service provider. The value of the
portion of the property deemed to have been
distributed as payment for services was zero. Yet,
the regulations provide that the section 83(b)
election is available. The section 83(b) election is
unavailable to a transfer in which the property has
no ascertainable market value,73 and so the
regulation’s statement that section 83(b) is
applicable constitutes an acknowledgment that
the compensatory transfer of property with a zero
value does not cause the property to have no
ascertainable value.
Johnson does not appear to contend that the
open transaction rule applies to carried interests.
Instead, he argues that the open transaction
approach can be used to solve what he sees as the
problem of allowing capital gain treatment for the
partnership’s distribution of its capital gain
income. As we discussed earlier in this article,
Johnson’s view rests on his contention that the
distributions should be seen as payments for the
managing partner’s performance of services. We
responded to that contention earlier in this article
and believe that we have shown that it is incorrect.
The “solution” that Johnson proposes is to a
problem that does not exist.
If the Erroneous Defense article’s proposal to
treat the distributions made to a managing
partner as compensation for his services were
adopted, it would have far-reaching
consequences. Venture capital and equity and
hedge funds are not the only partnerships that
have partners who received a partnership profits
interest as advance payment for their agreement
to provide services. There are numerous
partnerships in which some partners contribute
property and some contribute their agreement to
provide services. Many real estate partnerships
have that arrangement. If the distributions to the
partner who is the service provider are treated as
compensation for services performed as an
employee, the distributions would be subject to
employment taxes. The imposition of those taxes
would be inappropriate and costly.
Even if a carried interest were deemed subject
to the open transaction rule (and we believe that it

73

See reg. section 1 83-7(a).

is not), it would not apply because the partnership
interest would not be deemed to have no readily
ascertainable value. As noted, the open
transaction rule applies only in “rare and
extraordinary” circumstances.74 The receipt of a
partnership profits interest for an agreement to
provide services is neither rare nor extraordinary.
To the contrary, it is a common occurrence in the
formation of new partnerships.
IV. Conclusion
75

A partnership’s distribution of a portion of its
capital gain income to a managing partner is not
compensation for the services performed by that
partner. The managing partner received a
partnership profits interest as an advance
payment for his agreement to provide services to
the partnership. The distributions received by the
managing partner are his share of the
partnership’s income to which he is entitled
because of his holding a partnership interest. The
managing partner is treated by the tax law the
same as any other partner is treated. His share of
the partnership’s capital gains is characterized as
capital gains to him. There is no abuse to be cured.

Johnson’s Response — Last Words
by Calvin H. Johnson
Hard-fought debates tend to slide into less
important details as they go on. Like a
Mandelbrot fractal, as much energy and acrimony
is spent on the increasingly trivial issues as on the
broader scale. Readers, however, are less
entertained by the warfare that gets into the
trenches and smaller details.
Overall, Doug and Jeffrey Kahn offer a
hypothetical in which the managing partner
contributes no capital and has no basis in the

74

Reg. section 1.1001-1(a).

75

While we and other commentators refer to the taxation of
“distributions” to a service providing partner, that term is used for
convenience of discussion. As noted previously, the income recognized
by a partner is not from a distribution of property to him but rather is
from the allocation of the partnership’s income at the end of the year in
which it is earned by the partnership. If the income is not distributed in
that year and is distributed to the partner in a subsequent year, the
distribution typically will not be income to the partner.
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fund. The manager takes out, for example, $1
billion, attributable exclusively to managing. The
managers have zero return from investment of
basis, and all the return is a return to labor. The
Kahns nonetheless advocate a tax accounting
that makes all of the $1 billion capital gain, and
none of it compensation. Tax accounting has a
sacred duty of describing the economics. The
Kahns’ accounting does not reflect the economic
income.
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